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Abstract: This study investigates the internal factors of excessive product prolif-
eration. Since empirical literature on product over-proliferation focused on how to
optimize existing product portfolio, the causes of excessive product proliferation
have so far attracted little attention. This study employs a case study of Shiseido, a
famous Japanese cosmetics company, with particular attention to product prolif-
eration in the Shiseido chain store channel, because external factors are mostly
absent from this case. My results indicate that intra- and inter-organizational
inertia affects product line management. Due to Shiseido’s effort in the 1990s,
the company could maintain the advantage it and its cosmetics store channel held
with much the strategy as had been used until the mid-1970s. This strengthen
intra-organizational inertia at Shiseido. Inter-organizational inertia with cosmetics
stores makes Shiseido’s strategic change more difficult, which causes excess
proliferation.
Keywords: product proliferation, product strategy, organizational inertia, chan-
nel management, multi-channel strategy
1 Introduction
Firms often increase the number of their brands and products to meet diverse
consumer needs. This behavior, variously known as product proliferation, brand
proliferation, or product line and variety extension, is found in many industries.1
Given that there are diverse consumer needs, a firm that conducts product
proliferation is thought to garner a higher market share than one that does
not.2 Recently, however, empirical examination of the relationship of product
count to performance has shown contrary results. By executing product
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1 Mainkar et al. 2006.
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proliferation, a firm does not necessarily increase its market share;3 worse,
product proliferation often reduces margins.4 Indeed, the disadvantages of
over-proliferation have attracted much attention.5
If excessive product proliferation may even weaken a firm’s competitive-
ness, it is important to investigate its underlying causes in order to avoid it. The
principal focus of the empirical literature on product over proliferation, how-
ever, has been on how to optimize existing product portfolios.6 Though optimi-
zation is very important, without an understanding of the root causes of excess
proliferation, we cannot hope to avoid the problem.7
In this paper, therefore, I investigate the causes of excessive product pro-
liferation. I consider the connection between product proliferation and a firm’s
performance, focusing on inter-business relationships. In addition, I specifically
address the firms’ internal factors. I hypothesize that inter- and intra-organiza-
tional inertia affects a firm’s product line management, and may cause excess
proliferation.
2 Literature review
Research has revealed that product proliferation delivers not only advantages
but also disadvantages – these can be broadly grouped into increased cost8 and
consumer confusion.9 Product proliferation with these associated disadvantages
can be regarded as excessive, since afflicted firms lose profit. In addition,
product over proliferation can be classified into two types: the first is inevitably
driven by external factors, such as addressing customer needs; the second one is
caused by internal factors which cannot be explained in terms of competitors or
customers.
In the former, the external factors behind a firm’s product proliferation absent
profit comprise competitors and buyers. Firms often add products in lines affected
by competitors’ product proliferation, especially in oligopolistic markets. Connor
(1981) examined the relationship of market structure to the number of new
products introduced in the food industry, and found a significant relationship
3 Gourville/Soman 2005.
4 Van Hoek/Pegel 2006.
5 Homburg et al. 2010.
6 Avlonitis 1983, 1984; Kumar 2003; Lim/Tang 2006.
7 As opposed to my perspective, some researchers provide frameworks for managerial decisions
about optimal product variety (e.g., Ramdas 2003).
8 Lancaster 1979, 1990.
9 Aaker 2004; Huffman/Kahn 1998.
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between the concentration of sales and brand proliferation. He concludes that
imperfect market structures, like oligopoly, generate high levels of product pro-
liferation. Putis and Bayus (2001), in another example, studied the computer
industry, and note that when competitors offer multiple products to a heteroge-
neous consumer population in a competitive environment, a firm with only one or
two products may be at a distinct disadvantage. Thus, these findings suggest that
a prisoner’s dilemma exists, in which all firms may have excessively broad
product lines. When competitors’ product lines proliferate, product proliferation
may be an effective defensive strategy. In the Japanese nonlife insurance industry,
for example, Satō (2011) finds that excessive product proliferation occurred as the
industry became more competitive after the relaxation of regulation.
Firms often enlarge products lines in response to buyers. For instance, when
the bargaining power of buyers is relatively more powerful than that of suppli-
ers, buyers often require that products be customized to their particular
specifications. Little existing literature has mentioned this type of product pro-
liferation, but I speculate that this indeed often occurs. Recently, the rate of
product line increase has been greater than that of shelf space, with the adop-
tion of product proliferation by many suppliers, leading to a further growth in
the bargaining power of retailers.10 Quelch and Kenny (1994) found that, from
1985 to 1992, consumer goods SKUs increased an average of 16% annually, while
on the other hand, retail store shelf space increased only an average of 1.5%. In
their study, retailers responded to the product flood by rationing their shelf
space, stocking slow-moving items only when promoted by their manufacturers,
and charging manufacturers slotting fees to obtain shelf space for new items and
failure fees for items that do not meet sales targets. Indeed, powerful retailers
such as Walmart sometimes require food manufacturers to produce products
exclusively for them.11
The types of product proliferation noted above are inevitable, even though
they decrease firms’ profits. Unless they respond to the demands of the competi-
tive environment, firms face difficulty in surviving; in such an environment, the
case could be made that firms have no choice but to enlarge their product roster.
While the literature has shown that firms broaden their product lines
in response to external environmental factors, this paper focuses on internal
factors, which have so far attracted little attention. One of the few studies
conducted from this perspective is by Leonard-Barton (1994), in which she
examined the Japanese automobile industry, and pointed out that the reason
for too much variety and unnecessary options was that the core capability,
10 Chu/Messinger 1995; Messinger/Narasimhan 1995.
11 Fishman 2006.
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which had generated competitive advantage during the 1980s, had paradoxi-
cally become a core rigidity. Her research describes a situation in which internal
factors such as organizational inertia cause excessive product proliferation.
However, the specific process and underlying mechanism have not yet been
addressed.
3 Methodology
The principal focus of the empirical literature on excessive product proliferation
is its external driving factors. The current study focuses on the internal factors,
which have not received adequate consideration. At this preliminary stage,
qualitative research is appropriate.12 Therefore, this study employs a case
study of Shiseido, a famous Japanese cosmetics company, with particular atten-
tion to product proliferation in the Shiseido chain store channel.
Shiseido’s case is a reasonable subject because it is less likely to be affected
by external factors, for two reasons. The first is the tremendous bargaining
power that Shiseido holds over its chain store channel. Second, competition
within the cosmetic store channel is limited.13 External factors are mostly absent
from this case, and therefore the applicable internal factors can be more clearly
recognized.
To analyze Shiseido’s product line, I used Shukan Shogyo Corporation’s
Cosmetics in Japan, which contains information about trends in the Japanese
cosmetics industry and on almost all cosmetics products sold in Japan. From
that, I created a database including products from Shiseido, Shiseido
International, FT Shiseido, and Shiseido FITIT. Annual reports, newspaper arti-
cles, and in-depth interviews with seven employees were used to confirm the
corporate intent. I conducted semi-structured interviews, from one to three
hours each.
4 Case analysis
Shiseido attained competitive advantage by building its own distribution
channel, called the “Chain Store System” within Japan, beginning in 1923.
Through it, the company sold its products for the same price and with identical
12 Edmondson/Mcmanus 2007.
13 Sakuraki (2013) examined competition within the cosmetics store channel.
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service, and Shiseido could exercise stable management over that system.
Shiseido solidified its position by introducing many brands and products in
that period.
But with the emergence of drug stores in the late 1990s, consumers
were able to buy the same products at lower prices than in chain stores. Most
chain stores were small and their price competitiveness was therefore low. As a
result, the less-competitive chain stores were weakened. To differentiate chain
stores from drug stores, Shiseido introduced brands which were to be sold only
at chain stores. Nevertheless, sales volume in the chain store channel continued
to decrease. Considering this rationally, Shiseido could have decided to not
invest further in the chain store channel; instead, Shiseido continued to intro-
duce new products into the channel. In this section, I confirm the fact that
Shiseido continued to proliferate products in chain stores, and then point out
that this was caused by a sales department which had strong relationships with
the chain stores.
5 Excessive product proliferation
in the Shiseido chain store channel
Many researchers have examined the workings of the Chain Store System.14 In brief,
this was a systembywhich Shiseido assured those specialized “chain store” shops of
access to the same product, the same retail price, and identical service. In the
Japanese cosmetics industry generally at that time, cosmetics were sold at distressed
prices. This was a serious problem for both cosmetics stores and manufacturers. The
chain store system, which provided a win-win situation, therefore got strong support
from many retailers. The number of cosmetics stores which entered into agreements
with Shiseido gradually increased, and Shiseido built strong channel relationships
with these chain stores through this system.
Shiseido traded with chain stores in the Japanese way – based on relation-
ships between the players and oriented toward long-term business relation-
ships.15 However, the overwhelming advantage of Shiseido was threatened by
the emergence of drug stores in the late 1990s. The total sales volume of drug
stores exceeded that of cosmetics stores in 2002, continuing to this day.
To differentiate its chain stores from drug stores, Shiseido introduced brands
which were to be sold only at the former. Figure 1 shows Shiseido’s exclusive
14 Sakai 1979; Kohara 1994a, 1994b.
15 Tamura 1986.
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chain store product counts and the chain store sales volume. As the figure
suggests, an increased variety of products tends to be accompanied by a
decreased sales volume in this channel. The newly-introduced brand on which
Shiseido focused most attention in this channel is “BENEFIQUE”; Shiseido
continued to broaden the BENEFIQUE product line, increasing the SKUs in
that brand from 11 in 1996 to 270 in 2007.
The total sales volume of chain stores in 1996, when Shiseido launched
BENEFIQUE, was about 70% of that of the company as a whole, suggesting the
importance of the channel to Shiseido. Given that, launching BENEFIQUE to
differentiate chain stores from other channels can be seen as a reasonable
decision. As shown in Figure 1, however, despite broadening its product line,
the firm necessarily improve its performance. The decline in sales volume since
1999 is especially significant. Considering this rationally, Shiseido could have
decided not to invest further in the chain store channel, or could have adopted a
harvesting strategy.
In addition to this poor performance, two serious problems emerged within
Shiseido due to the excessive product proliferation. One involved the confusion
of salespeople and beauty experts – they could hardly remember the features
and specifications of all the products. Sometimes, even beauty experts couldn’t
answer customer questions about the difference between products. The second
Figure 1: Shiseido’s cosmetics store channel product counts and sales volume.
Note: The horizontal axis combines the “YOUR SHISEIDO,” “Cosmetic House,” “BENEFIQUE,”
“Qiola,” and “Loseraire” product lines.
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problem was the dilution of advertising and promotional budgets, which led to
the situation in which the firm could not invest enough in each brand and
product. Despite these difficulties, Shiseido continued to introduce new pro-
ducts into this channel.
In the following section, I detail the process of excessive product prolifera-
tion, as drawn largely from my interviews. My results indicate a three-part
process of over-proliferation at Shiseido: First, exclusive chain store brands,
such as BENEFIQUE, were introduced into select, powerful chain stores – not
the complete chain store channel. Second, Shiseido strengthened its approach to
the drug store channel while launching the exclusive chain store brands, pro-
voking dissatisfaction among the powerful chain stores; salespeople were deeply
conscious of dissent from the powerful chain stores. Third, brands and products
were not adequately managed inside Shiseido, in the sense that managers did
not necessarily need approval for new product introduction from top manage-
ment and the sales department could easily push its opinions within the com-
pany without careful examination, mostly on the strength of its experience in
overcoming the difficulties of structural change in the mid-1970s cosmetics
industry. Out of these, Shiseido’s product line proliferated to excess.
6 The introduction of channel exclusive brands
into powerful chain stores
Shiseido had employed a multi-channel strategy, which meant that the firm
offered its diverse channels the same products. This strategy led to conflict
between channels, with cosmetics stores demanding a solution. Products
which had been sold at identical prices with counseling in cosmetics stores
came to be sold at discount prices in drug stores; cosmetics stores couldn’t
help but reduce prices in the face of competition from the drug stores. Drug
stores can make up a decline in profit due to price reduction with their large
sales forces. That is, they have many chain shops of their own, and also carry a
wide variety of products. According to Yakuji Nippo, a Japanese drug industry
newspaper, in 2006, cosmetics accounted for 21.7% of overall drug store sales;
commodities accounted for 23.7%; medicines 28.7%; and all others 25.9%.
Drug stores could even increase sales in other categories by promoting cos-
metics as a loss leader.
In contrast, most cosmetics stores are small, mom-and-pop operations.
The average sales of a drug store are estimated at 280 million yen, whereas
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those of an average cosmetics store are 37 million yen. This suggests the
serious impact of price reduction on cosmetics stores. However, customers of
cosmetics stores that held fixed prices with counseling services made their
subsequent purchases of the same products at the discount prices available in
drug stores.
To address this conflict, Shiseido launched exclusive cosmetics store chan-
nel brands. Not all the cosmetics stores qualified, but those meeting certain
conditions could offer those brands. For instance, Shiseido set five criteria for
sellers of BENEFIQUE: (1) their adherence to the company’s management philo-
sophy; (2) their commitment to the brand; (3) a competitive location and sales
staff; (4) the stability of management; and (5) the importance of the store for
Shiseido in specific areas. Initially, only 4,000 of the 25,000 cosmetics stores at
that time met these criteria. The number of stores able to offer BENEFIQUE grew
over time, but Shiseido consistently maintained those standards. Clearly, the
selected stores were quite important to Shiseido.
Naturally, salespeople at Shiseido listened to the feedback from cosmetics
stores, especially from the select, powerful ones. As discussed below, there
existed frustration among the cosmetics stores about Shiseido’s strategy for
other channels, and the Shiseido sales staff was acutely aware of it.
7 The multi-channel strategy dilemma
In addition to cosmetics stores, Shiseido needed to strengthen its drug
store channel, which had seen significant growth. Therefore, the company
launched many low- and mid-priced brands. In this study, I define these
as brands for the mass market, sold across multiple channels. In Figure 2,
the bar chart shows the number of mass market and cosmetics store channel
exclusive brands, and the line chart shows the number of products. As
this suggests, Shiseido strengthened its mass market brands beginning in
the late 1990s.
The cosmetics stores did not welcome this approach because the Japanese
cosmetics industry at that time had become a scramble for pieces of a finite pie.
They raised objections: “Your company is expanding business toward China,
isn’t it?” “I heard that the company has plans to launch new brands for drug
stores,” “You always focus on drug stores,” and the like.16
16 Interview with Mr. Kohei Yanagida, channel development department, domestic cosmetics
division of Shiseido.
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8 Organizational Inertia at Shiseido
Excessive product proliferation cannot take place as long as the head office
properly controls new product introduction. At Shiseido, however, two factors
interfered. The first one was the company’s successful experience with increasing
sales through new brand launches and product introduction. Most Shiseido
employees had experienced the success of its product proliferation strategy during
the period of high economic growth in Japan. Managers from that era continued to
introduce new products out of inertia, without careful consideration. Mr. Toshihiko
Tatsuguchi17 talked about the difficulty of changing that practice, even though the
organization was aware of the strategy’s dysfunction. “The reason Shiseido con-
tinued to spend on introducing new brands is that the company dwells on its
strategy as it was during the period of high economic growth. We know that
intellectually; however, we can’t easily change this deeply-ingrained style.”
Shiseido’s strategy during the economic boom years meant the develop-
ment of sales networks and expanding its product line. This gave Shiseido a
competitive advantage, for two reasons. First, a low car diffusion rate and
Figure 2: Shiseido’s brands for drug stores and cosmetics stores.
Notes: Mass brands include all cosmetics products, except for high-priced brands and cos-
metics store exclusives. The price range for each brand is determined from Fuji-Keizai
Corporation’s Cosmetics Marketing Directory, 2007.
17 Chief of the brand planning department, domestic cosmetics division of Shiseido.
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undeveloped public transportation limited the transfer of consumers at that
time. To assure product sales, it was important to expand the sales network to
local markets.
Second, almost all consumers bought cosmetics at cosmetics stores, receiv-
ing counseling from beauty experts. As long as consumers came to the com-
pany’s beauty counter, the experts could listen to their needs and recommend
products from the company’s product line. Therefore, broader product lines were
required to meet diverse consumer needs, lest consumers look somewhere else.
In general, the strategy which worked successfully then shouldn’t have
worked after that time because the Japanese cosmetics market changed in the
mid-1970s. For instance, the range in application of a cosmetics resale system
decreased, growth of the industry slowed, and general merchandise stores (GMS)
emerged as a new distribution channel. However, Shiseido could exercise stable
management after the late 1970s, due to its efforts to insulate the existing
vertical price system from price competition.
Specifically, Shiseido reduced wholesale prices and strengthened the progres-
sive commission system to ensure retailers’ profit. To do this without decreasing
the company’s profit as well, it needed to reduce cost or increase sales volume. To
increase sales, the approach of the sales and product planning departments was
important: the employee evaluation system in the sales department was changed
to reflect sales to retailers, while the product planning department launched many
high-functional and age-based brands to set product prices higher.
In this way, Shiseido could protect its sales network of cosmetics stores from
fierce price competition with GMS. As a result, the company could maintain the
competitive advantage it and its cosmetics store channel held with much the
same strategy as had been used until the mid-1970s.
The second reason that the head office couldn’t properly control new
product introduction was the power of the sales department within Shiseido.
Traditionally, the sales department had relatively high power. For new product
introductions, decisions by top management were not required. Mr. Shinsaku
Suguyama, ex-President of Shiseido UK, stated: “The sales department, named
the chain stores sales division, traditionally exercised strong control within the
company. Mr. Fukuhara, the first chairman of the board had created a product
development department, which became the marketing department now, but the
department didn’t cooperate with the sales department well. There was a large
barrier between them.”
Indeed, in 1995, the marketing department, and then, in 2001, the cos-
metics business strategy department were established to design brand strategy
on a company-wide level, but the influence of the sales department on corpo-
rate strategy remained strong until recently. Mr. Toshihiko Tatsuguchi, the
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manager of the brand planning department, remarked on the sales depart-
ment, as below.
The sales department had acted on its own discretion until about 10 years ago; therefore I
think there was inefficiency in product management such as revision or abolition of
products and new product introduction. For instance, in case a newly launched product
did poorly in sales, it was difficult to discontinue the product if it had a longtime important
customer. We called those “powerful n= 1,” like the sample number “n= 100” in a survey.
Sometimes “powerful n= 1” is an end customer and other times it is a cosmetics store. We
sometimes ignored efficiency and continued to produce a product due to the voices of
“powerful n = 1.”
The sales department, which could exercise control over the company, heard the
voice of the cosmetics stores. As a result, the problems of introducing new
products without careful consideration and of maintaining dying products
arose. In this way, Shiseido committed excessive product proliferation, espe-
cially in the cosmetics store channel.
9 Discussion
The present case study is an examination of the causal factors behind exces-
sive product proliferation at one company. It helps to address the dearth of
research on excessive product proliferation, with a particular focus on the
internal factors underlying over-proliferation. At Shiseido, excessive product
proliferation began with the launch of exclusive cosmetics store channel
brands as a solution to channel conflict between cosmetics stores and drug
stores. Behind this lay intra- and inter-organizational inertia: Shiseido had
long-term relationships with cosmetics stores, which gave the company a
competitive advantage. In addition, Shiseido’s new product introduction pro-
cess reflected the inertia of having carried it out successfully in the past.
Shiseido had experience in overcoming the crisis of change in the Japanese
cosmetics market in the late 1970s, which, however, only reinforced its corpo-
rate strategic and organizational inertia.
This study suggests two situations in which companies proliferate products
to excess due to organizational problems. The first is when an existing channel
with which the company has a long-term relationship is threatened by the
emergence of a new channel. In this situation, the company needs to address
both an existing channel and a new channel. The greater the competitive
advantage of the existing channel, the greater the number of good customers.
Therefore, the company tends to respond to a good customer already in place.
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When the appearance of a new channel does not indicate market expansion, a
competition for pieces of a finite pie begins, provoking a channel dilemma for
the company.
The second situation is when organizational characteristics make it easy for the
company to introduce new products. It is often the case that a company experienced
success via its product proliferation strategy during its growth phase, because
barriers to the introduction of new products could be low for such a company.
This situation can also arise if the sales department has relative strength within an
organization, because it tends to point out the product itself or the absence of a
product meeting customer needs as a reason for a slowdown in sales.
These situations already arrived with the appearance of the Internet as a
sales channel. A company which had a competitive advantage in an existing
channel needs to consider its product strategy carefully.
Although I provide qualitative descriptions, there are some limitations. The first
one is a problem of generalizability. Whereas I investigated a firm in the Japanese
cosmetics industry, future research can attempt to test my findings statistically,
across many industries. Another limitation of this study is that I did not consider
the ways to respond to channel conflict. Additional research is needed on this
important topic, from the perspective of product proliferation strategy – for exam-
ple, to what extent companies should separate their products along sales channels.
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